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Abstract
The best shot game applied to networks is a discrete model of many processes of
contribution to local public goods. It has generally a wide multiplicity of equilibria that
we rene through stochastic stability. In this paper we show that, depending on how
we dene perturbations, i.e. the possible mistakes that agents can make, we can obtain
very dierent set of stochastically stable equilibria. In particular and non{trivially, if
we assume that the only possible source of error is that of an agent contributing that
stops doing so, then the only stochastically stable equilibria are those in which the
maximal number of players contributes.
JEL classication code: C72, C73, D85, H41.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we consider a stylized game of contribution to a discrete local public good
where the range of externalities is dened by a network. With a small probability players
may fail to play their best response and we analyze which equilibria are most stable to such
errors. In particular, we show that the nature of the mistake has a fundamental role in
determining the characteristics of such stable equilibria.
Let us start with an example.
Example 1. Ann, Bob, Cindy, Dan and Eve live in a suburb of a big city and they all have
to take private cars in order to reach downtown every working day. They could share the
car but they are not all friends together: Ann and Eve do not know each other but they
both know Bob, Cindy and Dan, who also don't know each other. The network of relations
is shown in Figure 1. In a one{shot equilibrium (the rst working day) they will end up
sharing cars. Any of our characters would be happy to give a lift to a friend, but we assume
here that non{linked people do not know each other and would not oer each other a lift.
No one would take the car if a friend is doing so, but someone would be forced to take it if
none of her/his friends is doing so. There is a less congestioned equilibrium in which Ann
and Eve take the car (and the other three take somehow a lift), and a more polluting one in






Figure 1: Five potential drivers in a network of relations.
Imagine to be in the less congestioned equilibrium. Now suppose that, even if they all
2agreed on how to manage the trip, in the morning Ann nds out that her car's engine is
broken and she cannot start it. She will call her three friends, who are however not planning
to take the car and will not be able to oer her a lift. As Ann does not know Eve, and Eve
will be the only one left with a car, Ann will have to wait for her own car to be repaired
before she can reach her workplace. Only if both cars of Ann and Eve break down, then
Bob, Cindy and Dan will take their cars, and we will shift to the inecient equilibrium. It
is easy to see that if we start instead from the congestioned equilibrium, then we need three
cars to break down before we can induce Ann and Eve to get their own. In this sense the
bad equilibrium is more stable, as it needs a less likely event in order to be changed with
another equilibrium. 
In this paper we analyze the best shot game:1 in a xed exogenous network of binary
relations, each node (player) may or may not provide a local public good. The best response
for each player is to provide the good if and only if no one of her neighbors is doing so.
In the previous example we have described an equilibrium where each player can take one of
two actions: take or not take the car. Then we have included a possible source of error: the
car may break down and one should pass from action `take the car' to action `not take the
car'. Clearly we can also imagine a second type of error, e.g. if a player forgets that someone
oered her/him a lift and takes her/his own car anyway. We think however that there are
situations in which the rst type of error is the only plausible one, as well as there can be
cases in which the opposite is true, and nally cases where the two are both likely, possibly
with dierent probabilities.
What we want to investigate in the present paper is how the likelihood of dierent kinds
of error may in
uence the likelihood of dierent Nash Equilibria. Formally, we will analyze
stochastic stability (Young, 1998) of the Nash equilibria of the best shot game, under dierent
assumptions on the perturbed Markov chain that allows the agents to make errors.
What we nd is that, if only errors of the type described in the example are possible,
that is players can only make a mistake by not providing the public good even if that is their
best response in equilibrium, then the only stochastically stable Nash equilibria are those
that maximize the number of contributors. If instead the other type of error (i.e. provide the
good even if it is a dominant action to free ride) is the only one admitted, or it is admitted
with a relatively high probability, then every Nash equilibrium is stochastically stable.
The best shot game is very similar to the local public goods game of Bramoull e and
Kranton (2007): they motivate their model with a story of neighborhood farmers, with
1This name for exactly the same game comes from Galeotti et al. (2010), but it stems back to the
non{network application of Hirshleifer (1983).
3reduced ability to check each others' technology (this is the network constraint), who can
invest in experimenting a new fertilizer. They assume that the action set of players is
continuous on the non{negative numbers (how much to invest in the new risky fertilizer),
they dene stable equilibria as those that survive small perturbations, and they nd that
stable equilibria are specialized ones, in which every agent either contributes an optimal
amount (which is the same for all contributors) or free rides, so that their stable equilibria
look like the equilibria of the discrete best shot game.
The main dierence between our setup and the one of Bramoull e and Kranton (2007)
is that in the best shot games that we study actions are discrete, errors, even if rare, are
therefore more dramatic and the concept of stochastic stability naturally applies. We think
that our model, even if stark, oers a valid intuition of why typical problems of congestion
are much more frequently observed in some coordination problems with local externalities.
Most of these problems deal with discrete choices. Trac is an intuitive and appealing
example,2 while others are given in the introduction of Dall'Asta et al. (2010). In such
complex situations we analyze those equilibria which are more likely to be the outcome of
convergence, under the eect of local positive externalities and the possibility of errors.
In next section we formalize the best shot game. Section 3 describes the general best
response dynamics that we apply to the game. In Section 4 we introduce the possibility of
errors thus obtaining a perturbed dynamics, and we present the main theoretical analysis of
the eects of dierent perturbation schemes. Finally, a brief discussion is in Section 5.
2 Best Shot Game
We consider a nite set of agents I of cardinality n. Players are linked together in a xed
exogenous network which is undirected and irre
exive; this network denes the range of a
local externality described below. We represent such network through a n  n symmetric
matrix G with null diagonal, where Gij = 1 means that agents i and j are linked together
(they are called neighbors), while Gij = 0 means that they are not. We indicate with
Ni the set of i's neighbors (the number of neighbors of a node is called its degree and is
also its number of links). A path between two nodes i and j is an ordered set of nodes
(i;h1;h2 :::h`;j) such that Gih1 = 1, Gh1h2 = 1, ..., Gh`j = 1. A connected subset J  I
2Economic modelling of trac have shown that simple assumptions can easily lead to congestion, even
when agents are rational and utility maximizers (see Arnott and Small, 1994). Moreover, if we consider the
discretization of the choice space, the motivation for the Logit model of McFadden (1973) were actually the
transport choices of commuting workers.
4is such that, for any i;j 2 J, there is a path between i and j where all the elements of the
path are members of J. Finally, a subset H  I is surrounding a subset J  I if, for any
h 2 H, we have that h = 2 J and there is j 2 J such that Gjh = 1.
Each player can take one of two actions, xi 2 f0;1g with xi denoting i's action. Action 1
is interpreted as contribution, and an agent i such that xi = 1 is called contributor. Similarly,
action 0 is interpreted as defection, and an agent i such that xi = 0 is called defector.3 We
will consider only pure strategies. A state of the system is represented by a vector x which
species each agent's action, x = (x1;:::;xi;:::;xn). The set of all states is denoted with
X.
Payos are not explicitly specied. We limit ourselves to the class of payos that generate
the same type of best reply functions.4 In particular, if we denote with bi agent i's best reply
function that maps a state of the system into a utility maximizer, then:
bi(x) =
(
1 if xj = 0 for all j 2 Ni ;
0 otherwise.
(1)
We introduce some further notation in order to simplify the following exposition. We
dene the set of satised agents at state x as S(x) = fi 2 I : xi = bi(x)g. Similarly, the set
of unsatised agents at state x is U(x) = I n S(x). We also refer to the set of contributors
as C(x) = fi 2 I : xi = 1g, and to the set of defectors as D(x) = fi 2 I : xi = 0g. We also
dene intersections of the above sets: the set of satised contributors is SC(x) = S(x)\C(x),
the set of unsatised contributors is UC(x) = U(x) \ C(x), the set of satised defectors is
SD(x) = S(x)\D(x), and the set of unsatised defectors is UD(x) = U(x)\D(x). Finally,
given any pair of states (x;x0) we indicate with K(x;x0) = fi 2 I : xi = x0
ig the set of agents
that keep the same action in both states, and we indicate with M(x;x0) = I n K(x;x0) the
set of agents whose action is modied between the states.
The above game is called best shot game. A state x is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of the best shot game if and only if S(x) = I and consequently U(x) = ;. We will call all
3As will be clear below, we are dealing with a local public good game, so probably free rider would be a
more suitable term than defector. Nevertheless, in the public goods game also \defector" is often used.
4Note that it would be very easy to dene specic payos that generate the best reply dened by (1):
imagine that the cost for contributing is c and the value of a contribution, either from an agent herself
and/or from one of her neighbors (players are satiated by one unit of contribution in the neighborhood), is
V > c > 0. There are however many other payo functions that could have the same best reply function (see
Bramoull e et al. (2010) for other examples). As we consider the whole class we are not entering a discussion
about welfare (i.e. aggregate payos { that could dier between the specic cases), but discuss only the issue
of congestion (i.e. the aggregate number of contributors).
5the possible Nash equilibria in pure strategies, given a particular network, as N  X.
The set N is always non{empty but typically very large. It is an NP{hard problem
to enumerate all the elements of N,5 and to identify, among them, those that maximize
and minimize the set C(x) of contributors. For extensive discussions on this point see
Dall'Asta et al. (2009) and Dall'Asta et al. (2010). Here we provide two examples, the
second one illustrates how even very homogeneous networks may display a large variability
of contributors in dierent equilibria.
Example 2. Figure 2 shows two of the three possible Nash equilibria of the same 5{nodes














Figure 2: Two Nash equilibria for a 5{nodes network. The dark blue stands for contribution,
while the light blue stands for defection.
Example 3. Consider the particular regular random network, of 20 nodes and homogeneous
degree 4, that is shown in Figure 3. The relatively small size of this network allows us to
count all its Nash equilibria. There exist 132 equilibria: 1 with 4 contributors (Figure 3, left),
17 with 5 contributors, 81 with 6 contributors, 32 with 7 contributors, 1 with 8 contributors
(Figure 3, right). 
5In particular, all maximal independent sets can be found in time O(3n=3) for a graph with n vertices
(Tomita et al., 2006).
6Figure 3: Two Nash equilibria for the same regular random network of 20 nodes and degree
4. The dark blue stands for contribution, while the light blue stands for defection. Picture
is obtained by means of the software Pajek (http://pajek.imfm.si/).
3 Unperturbed Dynamics
We imagine a dynamic process in which the network G is kept xed, while the actions x of
the nodes change.
At each time, which is assumed discrete, every agent best replies to the previous state
of the system with an i.i.d. positive probability  2 (0;1), while with the complementary
probability (1   ) her action remains the same. If we denote with x the current state and





bi(x) with i.i.d. probability  ;
xi with i.i.d. probability 1    :
(2)
By so doing, a Markov chain (X;T) turns out to be dened, where X is the nite state
space and T is the transition matrix6 resulting from the individual update process in (2).
We note that T depends on .
It is easy to check that the Markov chain (X;T) satises the following property, which
formalizes the idea that all and only the unsatised agents have the possibility to change
action:7
Txx0 > 0 if and only if M(x;x
0)  U(x) : (3)
6Txx0 denotes the probability to pass from state x to state x0.
7It is the generalized property (3) that we exploit in all the following propositions. Our results on the
unperturbed dynamics hold with any transition matrix satisfying that property. Note also that the Markov
chain dened in (3), and hence in (2), is aperiodic because, as M(x;x) = ; for all x, then Txx > 0 for all x.
7We introduce some terminology from Markov chain theory following Young (1998). A
state x0 is called accessible from a state x if there exists a sequence of states, with x as rst
state and x0 as last state, such that the system can move with positive probability from each
state in the sequence to the next state in the sequence. A set E of states is called ergodic
set (or recurrent class) when each state in E is accessible from any other state in E, and no
state out of E is accessible from any state in E. If E is an ergodic set and x 2 E, then x is
called recurrent. Let R denote the set of all reccurrent states of (X;T). If fxg is an ergodic
set, then x is called absorbing. Equivalently, x is absorbing when Txx0 = 1. Let A denote the
set of all absorbing states of (X;T). Clearly, an absorbing state is recurrent, hence A  R.
In the next two propositions we show that in our setup the set N of Nash equilibria is
equivalent to all and only the absorbing states (Proposition 1), and that there are no other
recurrent states (Proposition 2).
Proposition 1. A = N.
Proof. We prove double inclusion, rst we show that N  A.
Suppose x 2 N. Since by (3) we have that Txx0 > 0 with x0 6= x only if U(x) 6= ;, then
Txx0 = 0 for any x0 6= x, hence Txx = 1 and x is absorbing.
Now we show that A  N.
By contradiction, suppose x = 2 N. Then U(x) 6= ;. Consider a state x0 where x0
i = xi if
i 2 S(x), and x0
i 6= xi otherwise. We have that x0 6= x and, by (3), that Txx0 > 0, hence
Txx < 1 and x is not absorbing.
Proposition 2. A = R.
Proof. The rst inclusion A  R follows from the denitions of A and R.
Now we show that R  A.
We prove that every element x which is not in A is also not in R. Suppose that x = 2 A. We
identify, by means of a recursive algorithm, a state ^ x such that ^ x is accessible from x, but x
is not accessible from ^ x. This implies that x = 2 R.
By Proposition 1 we know that A = N. Then x = 2 N and we have that U(x) 6= ;. If
UC(x) 6= ;, we dene x0  x and we go to Step 1, otherwise we jump to Step 2.
Step 1. We take i 2 UC(x0) and we dene state x00 such that x00
i  0 6= x0
i = 1 and
x00
j  x0
j for all j 6= i.
Note that jjUC(x00)jj < jjUC(x0)jj. This is because of two reasons: rst of all, i 2 UC(x0) and
i = 2 UC(x00); the second is that UC(x00)  UC(x0), otherwise two neighbors contribute in x00
and do not contribute in UC(x0), but that is not possible because C(x00)  C(x0). Moreover,
8by (3) we have that Tx0x00 > 0.
We redene x0  x00. Then, if UC(x0) = ; we pass to Step 2, otherwise we repeat Step 1.
Step 2. We know that UC(x0) = ;. We take i 2 UD(^ x) and we dene state x00 such that
x00
i  1 6= x0
i = 0 and x00
j  x0
j for all j 6= i.
Note that jjUD(x00)jj < jjUD(x0)jj. This is because of two reasons: rst of all, i 2 UD(x0) and
i = 2 UD(x00); the second is that UD(x00)  UD(x0), otherwise two neighbors do not contribute
in x00 and do contribute in UC(x0), but that is not possible because D(x00)  D(x0).
We also note that still UC(x00) = UC(x0) = ;, since only i has become contributor and all i's
neighbors are defectors.
By (3) we have that Tx0x00 > 0. Finally, if UD(x00) 6= ; we redene x0  x00 and repeat Step
2, otherwise it means that ^ x = x00 and we have reached the goal of the algorithm.
The sequence of states we have constructed shows that ^ x is accessible from x.
Since U(x0) = ;, we have that T^ x^ x = 1 by (3), and hence x is not accessible from x0.







Figure 4: A non-Nash (non-absorbing) state for the same network of Figure 2. Here Bob
and Cindy are contributing, while Ann, Dan and Eve are not.
Example 4. Consider the network from Figure 2: both states (a) and (b) shown there are
absorbing, as they are Nash equilibria. Consider now the new state (c) on the same network,
shown in Figure 4: the satised nodes here are only the defectors Ann, Dan and Eve. Both
states (a) and (b) are accessible from state (c), but through dierent paths. To reach (a) from
9(c), the unsatised contributor Cindy should turn to defection, so that Eve would become
(the only) unsatised and would be forced to become a contributor. To reach (b) from (c),
both the unsatised contributors Bob and Cindy should simultaneously turn to defection,
then all the ve nodes would be unsatised. If we now turn to contribution exactly Ann,
Dan and Eve, we reach state (b). 
The following Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 adapt the results in Lemma 2 of Dall'Asta et al.
(2010) to our setup, as the dynamics employed there is dierent from ours. Both of them
play an important role in the analysis of the perturbed dynamics that we develop in Section
4.
Lemma 3 states that if we start from a Nash equilibrium, we impose to an agent i a change
from contribution to defection, and we let the dynamics T operate, then in no way agents
that are neither agent i, nor neighbors of agent i, will ever change their action. In other
words, under the above conditions the best reply dynamics is restricted to the neighborhood
of agent i.
Lemma 3. Suppose x 2 N and xi = 1. Dene x0 such that x0
i = 0 and x0
j = xj for all j 6= i.
Then, for every state x00 that is accessible from x0 through T we have that if x00
j 6= x0
j then
either j = i or j 2 Ni.
Proof. Call J  U(x0), J contains i (by assumption) and all and only nodes j 2 Ni (hence
x0
j = 0) such that there exists no k 2 Nj, such that x0
k = 1. Dene H  fh 2 I : h 2
S(x0); 9j 2 U(x0) such that h 2 Njg, that is the set of all satised agents that are neighbors
of some unsatised agent in x0. In the topology of the network, J is a connected subset and
H is the surronding set of J, so that any path between any node j 2 J and k 2 I n (J [ H)
contains at least a node h 2 H. Note that for any h 2 H we have that x0
h = 0, and then h
has at least a contributing neighbor k 2 I n(J [H). Then h is satised independently of the
action of any j 2 J. As T allows only unsatised agents to update their action, this proves
that for any x00 that is accessible from x0 through T, U(x00)  U(x0) = J. As J contains
only i and neighbors of i the statement is proven.
Lemma 4 states that if we start from a Nash equilibrium, we impose to an agent i a
change from defection to contribution, and we let the dynamics T operate, then in no way
agents that are neither agent i, nor neighbors of agent i, nor neighbors of neighbors of agent
i, will ever change their action. In other words, under the above conditions the best reply
dynamics is restricted to the neighborhood of neighbors of agent i.
10Lemma 4. Suppose x 2 N and xi = 0. Dene x0 such that x0
i = 1 and x0
j = xj for all j 6= i.
Then, for every state x00 that is accessible from x0 through T we have that if x00
j 6= x0
j then
either j = i or j 2 Ni or j 2 Nk for some k 2 Ni.
Proof. Call J0  U(x0), J0 contains i (by assumption) and all and only nodes j0 2 Ni such
that x0
j0 = 1. Call now J the set of all those nodes j 2 I such that there exists a node
j0 2 J0 nfig for which j0 2 Nj (hence x0
j = 0) and such that there exists no k 2 Nj nJ0, such
that x0
k = 1. We can now dene, as in the proof of Lemma 3, the subset H  I surrounding
J. The proof proceeds analogously. As J contains only i and neighbors of neighbors of i the
statement is proven.
4 Perturbed Dynamics
Given the multiplicity of Nash equilibria, we are uncertain about the nal outcome of (X;T),
that depends in part on the initial state and in part on the realizations of the probabilis-
tic passage from states to states. In order to obtain a sharper prediction, which is also
independent of the initial state, we introduce a small amount of perturbations and we use
the techniques developed in economics by Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993), Kandori
et al. (1993). Since the way in which perturbations are modeled has in general important
consequences on the outcome of the perturbed dynamics (see Bergin and Lipman, 1996), we
consider three specic perturbation schemes, each of which has its own interpretation and
may better t a particular application.
We introduce perturbations by means of a regular perturbed Markov chain (Young, 1993,
see also Ellison, 2000), that is a triple (X;T;(T )2(0; )) where (X;T) is the unperturbed
Markov chain and:
1. (X;T ) is an ergodic Markov chain, for all  2 (0; );
2. lim!0 T  = T;
3. there exists a resistance function r : X  X ! R+ [ f1g such that for all pairs of









r(x;x0) exists and is strictly positive if r(x;x0) < 1 ;
T 
xx0 = 0 for suciently small  if r(x;x0) = 1 :
The resistance r(x;x0) is part of the denition and can be interpreted informally as the
amount of perturbations required to move the system from x to x0 with a single application
11of T . It denes a weighted directed network between the states in X, where the weight of
the passage from x to x0 is equal to r(x;x0). If r(x;x0) = 0, then the system can move from
state x directly to state x0 in the unperturbed dynamics, that is Txx0 > 0. If r(x;x0) = 1,
then the system cannot move from x directly to x0 even in the presence of perturbations,
that is T 
xx0 = 0 for  suciently small.
Even if T and r are dened on all the possible states of X, we can limit our analysis
to the absorbing states only, which are all and only the recurrent ones (Proposition 2).
This technical procedure is illustrated in Young (1998) and simplies the complexity of the
notation, without loss of generality. Given x;x0 2 A, we dene r(x;x0) as the minimum
sum of the resistances between absorbing states over any path starting in x and ending in
x0.
Given x 2 A, an x-tree on A is a subset of AA that constitutes a tree rooted at x.8 We
denote such x-tree with Fx and the set of all x-trees with Fx. The resistance of an x-tree,








Finally, the stochastic potential of x is dened to be
(x)  minfr
(Fx) : Fx 2 Fxg :
A state x is said stochastically stable (Foster and Young, 1990) if (x) = minf(x) : x 2 Ag.
Intuitively, stochastically stable states are those and only those states that the system can
occupy after very long time has elapsed in the presence of very small perturbations.9
We rst consider two extreme types of perturbations in Subsections 4.1, 4.2. Then we
address cases that lie in between those extrema in Subsection 4.3.
4.1 Perturbations aect only the agents that are playing action 0
We assume that every agent playing action 0 can be hit by a perturbation which makes her
switch action to 1. Each perturbation occurs with an i.i.d. positive probability  2 (0;1).
No agent playing action 1 can be hit by a perturbation. We dene a transition matrix P 0;
{ that we call perturbation matrix { starting from individual probabilities, in the same way
8By tree we will refer only to this structure between absorbing states, and in no way to the topology of
the underlying exogenous undirected network on which the best shot game is played.
9For a formal statement see Young (1993).








xi if xi = 1 ; (
1 with i.i.d. probability  ;
0 with i.i.d. probability 1   
if xi = 0 :
(4)
The perturbation matrix P 0; collects the probabilities to move between any two states in
X when the individual perturbation process is as in (4). We assume our perturbed Markov
chain to be such that rst T applies and then errors can occur through P 0;. We now check
that (X;T;(T 0;)2(0; )), with T 0; = P 0;T, is indeed a regular perturbed Markov chain.10
1. (X;T 0;) is ergodic for all positive : this can be seen applying the last sucient
condition for ergodicity in Fudenberg and Levine (1998, appendix of Chapter 5), once
we take into account that i) A = R by Proposition 2, and ii) r(x;x0) < 1 for all
x;x0 2 A by the following Lemma 5.
2. lim!0 T 0; = T, since lim!0 P 0; is equal to the identity matrix.








(a) if r0(x;x0) = 1, then SC(x) \ M(x;x0) 6= ; and there is no way to go from x
to x0, since no satised agent can change in the unperturbed dynamics and no
contributor can be hit by a perturbation, hence T 
xx0 = 0 for every ;
(b) if r0(x;x0) < 1, then T
0;
xx0 has the same order of r(x;x0), when  approaches zero;
in fact, the agents in U(x)\M(x;x0) can change independently with probability
 when T is applied, the agents in SD(x) \ M(x;x0) can change independently
10We follow Samuelson (1997) when we derive the perturbed transition matrix T0; by post-multiplying
the unperturbed transition matrix T with the perturbations matrix P0;. If we exchange the order in the
matrix multiplication some details should change (since matrix multiplication is not commutative), but all
our results would still hold (as we iterate T0; and matrix multiplication is associative).
11The necessary assumption for our results is to have a regular perturbed Markov chain whose resistance
function is as in (5). By deriving it from an individual perturbation process (dened in (4)) and from an
individual update process (dened in (2)), we show that there exists at least one signicant case satisfying
this property.
13with probability  when P 0; is applied (and only then), and no agent is left since
SC(x) \ M(x;x0) = ;.
In the next remark we provide a lower bound for the resistance to move between Nash
equilibria under this perturbation scheme, and we then use such remark in Proposition 6.
Remark 1. When (5) holds, r
0(x;x0)  1 for all x;x0 2 N.
The following lemma, which is of help in the proof of Proposition 6, shows that under this
perturbation scheme any two absorbing states are connected through a sequence of absorbing
states, with each step in the sequence having resistance 1.
Lemma 5. When (5) holds, for all x;x0 2 A, x 6= x0, there exists a sequence x0;:::;xs;:::;xk,
with xs 2 A for 0  s  k, x0 = x and xk = x0, such that r
0(xs;xs+1) = 1 for 0  s < k.
Proof. Since x 6= x0, we have that k  1. We set x0 = x. Suppose xs is an element of the
sequence, and take is 2 C(x0) \ D(xs).
We dene state ~ x such that ~ xis  1 6= xs
is = 0 and ~ xj  xs
j for all j 6= is. Note that
r0(xs;~ x) = 1. We dene state ~ x0 such that ~ x0
j  0 for all j 2 Nis and ~ x0
k  ~ xk for any
other node k. We dene state xs+1 such that x
s+1
k = bk(~ x0) for all k 2 Nj, j 2 Nis, and
x
s+1
`  ~ x0
` for any other node `. By Lemma 4 and Proposition 1, xs+1 2 A. We note that
xs+1 is obtained from ~ x applying only the unperturbed dynamics T, hence the resistance
r
0(xs;xs+1) = 1.
Note that, since is = 2 D(xs+1) and (j 2 Nis ) j 2 D(x0)), then neither node is nor any
of her neigbors is in the set C(x0) \ D(xt), for all t  s + 1. As the network is nite, this
sequence reaches x0 in a nite number k of steps.
Next proposition provides a characterization of stochastically stable states under (5). We
use a known result by Samuelson (1994) to obtain stochastic stability from single-mutation
connected neighborhoods of absorbing sets.
Proposition 6. When (5) holds, a state x is stochastically stable in (X;T;(T 0;)2(0; )) if
and only if x 2 N.
Proof. We rst show that x 2 N implies x stochastically stable. Theorem 2 in Samuelson
(1994) implies that if x0 is stochastically stable, x 2 A, r(x0;x) is equal to the minimum
resistance between recurrent states, then x is stochastically stable. Since at least one re-
current state must be stochastically stable, Proposition 2 implies that there must exist an
absorbing state x0 that is stochastically stable. For any x 2 N, if x = x0 we are done. If
14x 6= x0, then by Proposition 1 we can use Lemma 5 to say that there exists a nite sequence
of absorbing states from x0 to x, where the resistance between subsequent states is always
1. Remark 1, together with Propositions 1 and 2, implies that 1 is the minimum resistance
between recurrent states. A repeated application of Theorem 2 in Samuelson (1994) shows
that each state in the sequence is stochastically stable, and in particular the nal state x.
It is trivial to show that x stochastically stable implies x 2 N. By contradiction, suppose
x = 2 N. Then, by Propositions 1 and 2, x = 2 R, and hence cannot be stochastically stable.
Proposition 6 tells us that, under the perturbation scheme considered in this subsection,
stochastic stability turns out to be ineective in selecting among equilibria.
4.2 Perturbations aect only the agents that are playing action 1
Now we assume that every agent playing action 1 is hit by an i.i.d. perturbation with prob-
ability  2 (0;1), while no agent playing action 0 is susceptible to perturbations. Again
we indicate with x the state prior to perturbations and with x0 the resulting state, and we







xi if xi = 0 ; (
0 with i.i.d. probability  ;
1 with i.i.d. probability 1   
if xi = 1 :
(6)
We denote with P 1; the perturbations matrix resulting from (6). We check that (X;T;(T 1;)2(0; )),
with T 1; = P 1;T, is indeed a regular perturbed Markov chain.
1. (X;T 1;) is ergodic for all positive  by the same argument of the corresponding point
in the previous Subsection 4.1, once we replace Lemma 5 with Lemma 7.
2. lim!0 T 1; = T, since lim!0 P 1; is equal to the identity matrix.




jjSC(x) \ M(x;x0)jj if SD(x) \ M(x;x0) = ;
1 otherwise
(7)
In fact, analogously to what happens for Subsection 4.1,
(a) if r1(x;x0) = 1, then SD(x) \ M(x;x0) 6= ; and there is no way to go from x
to x0, since no satised agent can change in the unperturbed dynamics and no
defector can be hit by a perturbation, hence T 
xx0 = 0 for every ;
15(b) if r1(x;x0) < 1, then T
0;
xx0 has the same order of r(x;x0) when  approaches zero;
in fact, the agents in U(x)\M(x;x0) can change independently with probability
 when T is applied, the agents in SC(x) \ M(x;x0) can change independently
with probability  when P 1; is applied (and only then), and no agent is left since
SD(x) \ M(x;x0) = ;.
This remark plays the same role of Remark 1.
Remark 2. When (7) holds, r
1(x;x0)  1 for all x;x0 2 N.
The following lemma shows that the resistance between any two absorbing states is equal
to the number of contributors that must change to defection. This result is less trivial than
it might appear: it shows that there is no possibility that by changing only some of the
contributors to defectors, the remaining ones are induced to change by the unperturbed
dynamics. The lemma could be proven directly from Lemma 3, but we nd more intuitive
the argument below.
Lemma 7. When (7) holds, for all x;x0 2 A, r
1(x;x0) = jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj.
Proof. We rst show that r
1(x;x0)  jjC(x)\D(x0)jj. By contradiction, suppose r(x;x0) <
jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj. Then, some i 2 C(x) \ D(x0) must switch from contribution to defection
along a path from x to x0 by best reply to the previous state. This requires that in the
previous state there must exist some j 2 Ni that contributes. However, j 2 D(x) and j
can never change to contribution as long as i is a contributor, neither by best reply nor by
perturbation when (7) holds.
We now show that r
1(x;x0)  jjC(x)\D(x0)jj. Dene state ~ x such that ~ xi  0 6= xi = 1
for all i 2 C(x) \ D(x0), and ~ xi  xi otherwise. Note that r(x;~ x) = jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj. Note
also that bi(~ x) = 1 for all i 2 C(x0) \ D(~ x). This means that r(~ x;x0) = 0, and therefore
r(x;x0)  r(x;~ x) + r(~ x;x0) = jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj.
We now use Lemma 7 to relate algebraically the resistance to move from x to x0 to the
resistance to come back from x0 to x.
Lemma 8. When (7) holds, for all x;x0 2 A, r(x;x0) = r(x0;x) + jjC(x)jj   jjC(x0)jj.
Proof. From Lemma 7 we know that r(x;x0) = jjC(x)\D(x0)jj. Note that jjC(x)\D(x0)jj =
jjC(x)jj   jjC(x) \ C(x0)jj. Always from Lemma 7 we also know that r(x;x0) = jjC(x0) \
D(x)jj = jjC(x0)jj  jjC(x) \ C(x0)jj, from which jjC(x) \ C(x0)jj = C(x0)   r(x0;x), which
substituted in the former equality gives the desired result.
16We are now ready to provide a characterization of stochastically stable states under (7).
Proposition 9. When (7) holds, a state x is stochastically stable in (X;T;(T 1;)2(0; )) if
and only if x 2 argmaxx02N jjC(x0)jj.
Proof. We rst prove that only a state in argmaxx02N jjC(x0)jj may be stochastically stable.
Ad absurdum, suppose jjC(x)jj = 2 argmaxx02N jjC(x0)jj and x is stochastically stable. There
must exist x0 such that jjC(x0)jj > jjC(x)jj. Take an x-tree Fx. Consider the path in Fx
going from x0 to x, that is the unique f(x0;x1);:::;(xk 1;xk)g such that x0 = x0, xk = x,
and (xi;xi+1) 2 Fx for all i 2 f0;k   1g. We now modify Fx by reverting the path from x0
to x, so we dene Fx0  (Fx n f(xi;xi+1) : i 2 f0;k   1gg) [ f(xi+1;xi) : i 2 f0;k   1gg,













jjC(xi)jj), that simplies to r
1(Fx0) = r(Fx)+jjC(x)jj jjC(x0)jj. Since jjC(x0)jj > jjC(x)jj,
then r
1(Fx0) < r
1(Fx). In terms of stochastic potentials, this implies that (x0) < (x),
against the hypothesis that x is stochastically stable.
We now prove that any state in argmaxx02N jjC(x0)jj is stochastically stable. Since
at least one stochastically stable state must exist, from the above argument we conclude
that there exists x 2 argmaxx02N jjC(x0)jj that is stochastically stable. Take any other
x0 2 argmaxx02N jjC(x0)jj. Following exactly the same reasoning as above we obtain that
(x0) = (x). Since (x) is a minimum, (x0) is a minimum too, and x0 is hence stochastically
stable.
Previous proposition is the main point of this work: it provides a characterization of
stochastically stable equilibria which is much more rened than the one obtained in Propo-
sition 6. Next section analyzes the stability of this result, and generalizes to a wider class of
possible sources of errors.
4.3 Perturbations aect all agents
We have obtained dierent results about stochastic stability in the extreme cases when
perturbations hit exclusively agents playing either contribution or defection. We are now
interested in understanding what happens when we allow both types of perturbation. In
particular, we assume that every agent playing action 1 is hit by an i.i.d. perturbation
with probability  2 (0;1), and every agent playing action 0 is hit by an i.i.d. perturbation
17m, where m is a positive real number.12 Formally, with x denoting the state prior to





> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
(
1 with i.i.d. probability m ;
0 with i.i.d. probability 1   m if xi = 0 ;
(
0 with i.i.d. probability  ;
1 with i.i.d. probability 1   
if xi = 1 :
(8)
We denote with P m; the perturbations matrix resulting from (8).
We check that (X;T;(T m;)2(0; )), with T m; = P m;T, is indeed a regular perturbed
Markov chain.
1. (X;T m;) is ergodic because if a state x0 is accessible from a state x in (X;T 0;) or in
(X;T 1;), then the same is true in (X;T m;).
2. lim!0 T m; = T, since lim!0 P m; is equal to the identity matrix.







In fact, the agents in U(x) \ M(x;x0) can change independently with probability 
when T is applied; the agents in SC(x) \ M(x;x0) can change independently with
probability  when P m; is applied (and only then); and the agents in SD(x)\M(x;x0)
can change independently with probability m when P m; is applied (and only then).
The usual kind of remark sets a lower bound to the resistance between any two absorbing
states.
Remark 3. When (9) holds, r
m(x;x0)  minf1;mg for all x;x0 2 N.
We are ready for the last result: what happens when all agents are aected by perturba-
tions.
Proposition 10. When (9) holds:
12We might have used m0 for the probability that a perturbation hits a defector and m1 for the probability
that a perturbation hits a contributor. Here we adopt, without loss of generality, the normalization that
  m0 and m  m1=m0.
181. if m  1, then a state x is stochastically stable in (X;T;(T k;)2(0; )) if and only if
x 2 N;
2. if m  maxi2IfjjNijjg, then a state x is stochastically stable in (X;T;(T m;)2(0; )) if
and only if x 2 argmaxx02N jjC(x0)jj.
Proof. Suppose m  1. Following the proof of Lemma 5, we obtain that when (9) holds, for
all x;x0 2 A, x 6= x0, there exists a sequence x0;:::;xs;:::;xk, with xs 2 A for 0  s  k,
x0 = x and xk = x0, such that r(xs;xs+1) = m for 0  s < k. This result and Remark
3 allow us to follow the proof of Proposition 6 and use m instead of 1, obtaining the same
result as in Proposition 6.
Suppose now that m  maxi2IfjjNijjg. We show that the resistances are the same as in
Subsection 4.2, i.e., for all x;x0 2 A, r
m(x;x0) = jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj. Therefore Lemma 8 and
Proposition 10 apply here too, and the result is obtained.
Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 imply that there is only one way to change the agents in C(x)\
D(x0) from contribution to defection, other than letting each of those agents be hit by a
perturbation. This way is to let some neighbors of all the agents in C(x) \ D(x0) be hit
by a perturbation changing their action from defection to contribution. This amounts to
having at least jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj=maxi2IfjjNijg perturbations, each of which costs m. Since
m  maxi2IfjjNijg by assumption, this way of reaching x0 from x has at least a cost of
jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj. This shows that r
m(x;x0) = jjC(x) \ D(x0)jj.
In the next examples we give the stochastically stable sets of the game, for the whole
range of values of m, for a very simple network. Even if the example is simple, it may give
a hint on the complexity of situations that may arise in general, for values of m between 1
and maxi2IfjjNijjg.
Example 5. Consider the network from introductory Figure 1. This network has two Nash
equilibria, one in which the two peripheral nodes Ann and Eve contribute (call it NE2),
another one in which the three central nodes Bob, Cindy and Dan do so (call it NE3).
Imagine that we want to nd the stochastically stable equilibria deriving from (8), and
hence (9), as  ! 0.
To pass from NE2 to NE3 we need that at least one of the central nodes starts contributing
(with probability m) or both Ann and Eve stop contributing (with probability 2). This
event happens with a probability of order minfm;2g, this number is the resistance from NE2
to NE3. To pass from NE3 to NE3 we need that at least one between Ann and Eve starts
contributing (with probability m) or altogether Bob, Cindy and Eve stop contributing (with
probability 3). This event happens with a probability of order minfm;3g, the resistance
19from NE3 to NE2.
Summing up, the two equilibria are both stochastically stable if m  2, as in this case the
two resistances are equal. If instead m > 2, then only NE3 is stochastically stable, as the
resistance from NE3 to NE2 is minfm;3g, while the one from NE2 to NE3 is 2. 
5 Discussion
The best shot game is a very stark model, and clearly misses the details of any specic
real{world situation. We think however that, as the model in Schelling (1969) has done for
the issue of residential segregation, this model is able to describe the backbone structure of
incentives in many problems of local contribution, as discussed in the introduction. The best
shot game has multiple equilibria, so a renement is needed to understand which outcomes
are likely to emerge.
As we deal with discrete actions, the natural candidate for selection is stochastic stability:
it selects the equilibria that are more likely to be observed in the long run, in the presence
of small errors occurring with a vanishing probability. It is well known (Bergin and Lipman,
1996) that dierent equilibria can be selected depending on the assumptions on the relative
likelihood of dierent types of errors, as indeed it occurs in our model (see the detailed
discussion in Section 4). Blume (2003) focuses on nding sucient conditions for the errors,
in a perturbed dynamic on a discrete action space, such that stability gives always the same
prediction. This dependence of stochastically stable states on the type of perturbations
is often interpreted as a limitation of the predictive ecacy of stochastic stability, since
essentially any equilibrium can be selected by means of stochastic stability with proper
assumptions on the errors. We think instead that what enriches the analysis is exactly this
dependence of the selected equilibria on the nature of errors. Our model is in principle very
general, but if we try to apply it to a particular situation, it can adapt itself to the object
of analysis and give specic predictions (as has been done, for a very dierent model, by
Ben-Shoham et al., 2004). In particular, we derive interesting results for the case in which
errors that stop contribution are much more frequent than errors that make contribution
arise. We think that this is a property of many real{world situations in which the action of
contributing involves much more individual eort than the action of non contributing, but
also requires some external factor to be carried out (such as a car in order to give a lift).
However, such an external factor may accidentally be damaged (e.g. a car engine may break
down). The counter{intuitive result is that, exactly in those cases, the selected equilibrium
will be the one with highest congestion, i.e. the number of contributors is the highest among
20equilibria.13
We leave for future research the analysis of more general models of network games, in
which the eort of a player is substitute to the eort of her neighbors (for a formal denition
see Galeotti et al., 2010). This is clearly the case of the best shot game, but possibly some
of the results achieved in this paper could be generalized. Bramoull e et al. (2010) consider
a particular class of games in which actions are continuous and neighbors' eorts are linear
substitutes, and they analyze asymptotic stability as dened in Weibull (1995). It would be
interesting, in more general games with a discrete strategy space, to compare and possibly
generalize their ndings with the results that we obtain for stochastic stability.
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